1. The actual truth of my perceptions is only relevant if my delusion could ever have perceptible effects on me, no? But these perceptible effects would, then, give me the information needed to achieve a better understanding of the world. There is value in seeking out such information (such that I don't get negatively surprised by being wrong) but if there is a fundamentally unknowable world out there - I don't really care.
2. At any given time, I can only operate under my current information. If the best model explaining all my current information suggests an external physical reality with some physical laws - then this is the model I will keep as my working hypothesis, until I find/need a better one. Whether it is 'true' in some metaphysical sense is not so important.
It is a very computer science/engineering approach, I fear, but I found it valuable to fend of the existential dread.
Sorry for the late reply Ben! I certainly agree that a pragmatic approach is sensible, and that it is reasonable to choose not to worry about truths that are fundamentally unknowable. However, this itself serves as an indication that science is not simply an endeavour to discover all the objective truths of reality, if we accept that there are indeed truths that are unknowable. This need not cause existential dread, but could nonetheless be important in deciding where to focus scientific attention and what to expect from scientific inquiry.
Two counterarguments come to my mind:
1. The actual truth of my perceptions is only relevant if my delusion could ever have perceptible effects on me, no? But these perceptible effects would, then, give me the information needed to achieve a better understanding of the world. There is value in seeking out such information (such that I don't get negatively surprised by being wrong) but if there is a fundamentally unknowable world out there - I don't really care.
2. At any given time, I can only operate under my current information. If the best model explaining all my current information suggests an external physical reality with some physical laws - then this is the model I will keep as my working hypothesis, until I find/need a better one. Whether it is 'true' in some metaphysical sense is not so important.
It is a very computer science/engineering approach, I fear, but I found it valuable to fend of the existential dread.
Sorry for the late reply Ben! I certainly agree that a pragmatic approach is sensible, and that it is reasonable to choose not to worry about truths that are fundamentally unknowable. However, this itself serves as an indication that science is not simply an endeavour to discover all the objective truths of reality, if we accept that there are indeed truths that are unknowable. This need not cause existential dread, but could nonetheless be important in deciding where to focus scientific attention and what to expect from scientific inquiry.